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Taiwan’s Mainlanders: A Diasporic
Identity in Construction
Les Chinois de Taiwan : la construction d’une identité diasporique
Los chinos de Taiwán: la construcción de una identidad “diáspórica”
Simon Scott
The old is dying, and the new cannot be born;
in this interregnum there arise a great
diversity of morbid symptoms
(Antonio Gramsci, cited in Crapanzano, 1986: 47).
1 Diaspora is a relatively new concept to the study of Taiwan; but is nonetheless a useful
conceptual  tool  in  understanding shifting  ethnic  relations  during the  island nation’s
tumultuous and yet unfinished process of decolonization. Taiwanese political discourse of
the past  two decades has constructed Taiwanese society as  comprised of  four ethnic
groups. These are the indigenous peoples of Austronesian descent (approximately 2% of
the population), whose presence on Taiwan dates back over 6000 years; the Hoklo (72%),
whose paternal ancestors started arriving from Fujian Province of China during Dutch
occupation of part of Taiwan in the 1600s; the Hakka (13%) whose ancestors came from
Guangdong Province mostly in the 18th and 19th centuries, and finally the Mainlanders
(13%), who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek after the conclusion of the Second World War in
1945 (Corcuff, 2002: 163). 
2 Mainlanders, the group under discussion in this article, are called waishengren in Chinese
or goa-seng-lang in Taiwanese, both meaning “people from outside the province.” This
ethnic identity, determined by an imaginary province of origin that some individuals had
never even seen, was even a legal category on official documents until 1992. The process
by which waishengren and their Other (benshengren or “people of the province”) became
social  categories of ethnicity demonstrate clearly how legal categories metamorphose
into ethnic categories in ways unimagined by their creators (Corcuff, 2002: 171). 
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3 As  Taiwanese  nationalism  gains  ascendancy  over  Chinese  nationalism  in  Taiwanese
society, Mainlanders are increasingly adopting a diasporic identity as Chinese in Taiwan
(Chang, 2005). The labels and boundaries between ethnic groups are clearly related to the
construction of a national identity on Taiwan; and need to be interrogated for the lessons
they can teach us about the relationship between migration, decolonization, diasporas,
and nationalism. Although these processes of national fragmentation and ethnicisation
are part of the global Zeitgeist of our times (Elbaz and Helly, 1995), the case of Taiwan is
particularly interesting because the boundaries between diasporas and the nation have
changed so rapidly. 
4 In order to understand the relationship between diasporic imaginations and nationalism
in this fascinating case study, it is important to ask the following questions: To what
extent do Taiwan’s Mainlanders constitute a diasporic community? How do discourses of
Chinese diaspora in Taiwan contrast with, or articulate with, co-existing discourses of
colonialism  and  resistance,  as  well  as  discourses  of  republican  or  multicultural
citizenship? What do these competing discourses say about how the larger meaning of
diaspora? 
 
Diaspora as a form of ethnic identity
5 In anthropology, constructionist approaches to ethnicity are based largely on the insights
of  Norwegian  anthropologist  Fredrik Barth  who  argued  that  ethnic  groups  are  not
objective entities, but are rather formed through boundaries they form with others in
specific historical circumstances (Barth, 1969). Since diasporas constitute one particular
variety of ethnic group, James Clifford similarly used the term diaspora as “a signifier, not
simply of transnationality and movement, but of political struggles to define the local, as
distinctive  community,  in  historical  contexts  of  displacement”  (Clifford,  1994:  308).
Diaspora,  argues Clifford,  exists  largely in tension with nationalist  and autochtonous
identity formations in which different groups use different criteria to claim “native”
status on the same territory.
6 Within  this  larger  political  context,  diasporas  often  share  a  number  of  broad
characteristics.  Safran  defined  diasporas  as  “expatriate  minority  communities”
characterized by an experience of dispersal from their homeland, collective memories of
that homeland, a belief that they are not accepted in their new land, a desire for return,
support of their homeland, and a collective identity constructed around their place of
origin (Safran, 1991: 83-84). Diasporic identities are closely related to national identities,
as  they  define  who  belongs  to,  but  also  whom  is  excluded  from  a  given  nation  as
“imagined community” (Anderson,  1991).  Diasporas  are  non-native  in relationship to
ethnic nationalisms, but can be more easily absorbed into civic nationalisms. As with
national borders, therefore, the boundaries between diaspora and nativist identities are
often contested from both sides.
7 Diaspora studies have usually focused on immigrant communities. The Jews constitute
the paradigmatic case of diaspora due to their dispersal throughout the world; strong
collective identity; ritualized memories of the lost homeland; and a desire for spiritual, if
not physical, return to Israel. Armenians, Africans throughout the North Atlantic, and
immigrant Asians are also frequently studied as diasporas.  Less commonly studied as
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diasporas are those peoples, such as Europeans in North America or Africa, who dispersed
to other parts of the world as part of a colonizing project (Schnapper, 2001: 11).
8 In the process of decolonization, however, diaspora becomes relevant to those situations,
especially for members of communities who have stayed behind rather than returning to
their places of origin. Yet in order to avoid an overuse of the concept of diaspora, it is
important to limit it to cases in which there is some institutionalized exchange between
the home and diaspora communities, as well as at least an imaginary desire to “return”
(Schapper, 2001: 31). Without those two elements, the English and the French of Canada
do not constitute diaspora communities, but, as argued below, the Mainlanders of Taiwan
do. In colonial and post-colonial situations, the formation of diaspora identity constitutes
an  unfinished  process  of  struggle  and  negotiation  in  which  past  colonialism shapes
contemporary struggles. The postcolonial construction of such diasporas is as important
in the study of Taiwan’s Mainlanders as it is for whites in South Africa.
 
Mainlander ethnic identity
9 Although most of the anthropological literature on Taiwan since the 1970s has subsumed
Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese under the general rubric of “Chinese culture,” the
ethnic boundaries between them have also been recognized as salient,  especially the
boundary constructed between Mainlanders and “Native Taiwanese,” referring to both
the Hoklo and the Hakka.  Although the boundaries  between these groups are also a
product of Chinese Nationalist rule (see below), they have been increasing reinforced in
public discourse since the gradual democratization and decolonization of Taiwan that
began in the 1980s.
10 Group identities constructed around the four ethnicities of Mainlanders, Hakka, Hoklo
and Aboriginal have been particularly prone to mobilization during political rallies and at
election time. As the Native Taiwanese gained power in Taiwan, the Mainlanders have
lost many of the privileges they enjoyed in the past.  In this context,  they fear being
classified as members of an ethnic minority or political scapegoats. Many Mainlanders
feel threatened by this shift in political power and by the ethnic discourse that has come
with  it;  and  thus  believe  rumours  that  Native  Taiwanese  have  even  shouted  out
“Mainland  pigs  go home!”  at  political  rallies.  Yet  in  a  democratic  country  where
alternative nationalisms can be freely expressed and contested, it is difficult to return to
the old discourse that “we are all Chinese”– especially since in practice the groups have
never  been  equal.  Instead,  Mainlanders  seem  to  be  reluctantly  constructing  a  new
diasporic identity to negotiate a new place a Taiwan that is going through a process of
decolonization comparable to that of South Africa (Wu, 2002).
11 Mainlander dis-ease with Taiwanese nationalism is readily apparent in Taiwan. After the
2004 presidential elections, for example, when Native Taiwanese candidate Chen Shui-
bian won the presidency for the second time, a heavily-accented Mainlander taxi driver
explained to  me that  the  results  would  surely  be  disastrous.  He  argued that  Chen’s
Taiwanese  nationalism  was  dangerous  and  could  easily  lead  to  violence  against
“foreigners” like himself.  When I argued that surely all people who carry Republic of
China passports are Taiwanese, he referred to the Native Taiwanese saying, “They don’t
recognize that. They think we Mainlanders are not Taiwanese. To them, we are Chinese.
We  are  foreigners.”  He  broke  into  tears  as  he  contemplated  on  the  possibility  that
political change might bring about an official declaration of Taiwanese independence and
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thus the end of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Conversations such as this, which reflect
Mainlander discomfort with political developments in Taiwan, provide a useful point of
departure for the study of the Mainlander diaspora as a new form of ethnic identity in the
country.
 
The historical genesis of Mainlander identity on
Taiwan
12 Due to their phenotypical similarities, the differences between Mainlanders and Native
Taiwanese seem small compared to those between “black” and “white” Africans unless
one keeps in mind that all ethnicities are relationships of power rather than essentialized
objects in themselves. Not unlike different ethnic groups in Africa, the boundary between
Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese was formed out of conflict, violence and oppression.
After Japan’s defeat at the conclusion of the Second World War, the Allied Forces under
General MacArthur transferred the Japanese colony of Taiwan to the administration of
the Republic of China without consulting the local people about their future.
13 Those  people  already  living  on  Taiwan,  the  indigenous  Austronesian  tribes  and  the
numerical  majority  of  “Native  Taiwanese”,  were  soon  faced  with  the  problem  of
accommodating  newcomers  from  China.  Due  to  historical  circumstances,  the  social
distance between the groups was large. The indigenous peoples spoke Japanese and a
variety of Austronesian languages. Native Taiwanese spoke Japanese and Hakka or Hoklo,
the latter known now as “Taiwanese”, while the Mainlanders spoke Mandarin Chinese
with various degrees of proficiency and various Chinese dialects.  Although it is often
claimed that Hakka and Hoklo (Taiwanese) are merely dialects of Chinese, the difference
between Taiwanese and Mandarin is as different as that between Dutch (or Afrikaaner)
and English. The Austronesian languages are not related to Chinese at all; but are instead
related to other Pacific islander languages such as Maori, Hawaiian and Chamorro.
14 Between 1945 and 1949, several waves of people started arriving from China to Taiwan,
including members of the new military administration under Chen Yi, those sent by the
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to establish civil  and military authority, and Chinese
civilians looking for job opportunities. After the Chinese Revolution of 1949, the Chinese
Nationalist  Party was forced to retreat  to Taiwan,  bringing with them more military
personnel  and  an  unknown  number  of  civilian  refugees.  They  depended  on  the
Nationalist government for housing and living; and initially expected that their return to
China would be imminent. Not expecting to settle down permanently in Taiwan, they
identified strongly with the Chinese Nationalist Party, with their places of origin in China,
and felt a strong sense of cultural superiority over the Taiwanese (Corcuff, 2002: 172-174).
15 Relations between the two groups were particularly strained in the aftermath of  the
tragic events of the 1940s. After the Republic of China arrived on Taiwan in 1945, the new
government  began  by  confiscating  property  belonging  to  the  Japanese  colonial
government,  Taiwanese  enterprises  and  even  individuals.  They  appropriated  large
amounts of local commodities – including basic needs such as sugar, salt and rice – to be
shipped to the mainland; a situation that led to critical shortages and inflation in Taiwan
(Morris, 2004: 20). Chinese soldiers terrorized the local population by stealing, looting
and raping. Resentment led to the Taiwanese making unfavorable comparisons with the
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Japanese,  saying that the takeover was a situation of  “the dogs leaving and the pigs
coming.”
16 Disaster  struck on the evening of  February 27,  1947,  when agents  of  the Taipei  City
Monopoly Board tried to confiscate the contraband cigarettes that a woman peddler was
selling on the street. When she was injured in the ensuing scuffle, neighbors tried to
defend her and a riot broke out, leading to the police shooting of a bystander. As news of
the  event  spread  throughout  Taiwan,  local  leaders  set  up  “February  28  Resolution
Committees” to demand investigation of the incident, democratic and economic reforms,
and limited self-rule. Governor Chen Yi promised to negotiate, but actually requested
military  reinforcement  from China.  When troops  arrived,  they first  killed  Taiwanese
indiscriminately on the streets and then rounded up opposition leaders for execution.
The exact casualty numbers are still unknown, but estimates range from a few hundred to
more than 20 000. Martial law was imposed afterwards and would last forty years – the
longest period of martial law in human history. Those years are now known as the time of
“white terror.”
17 It was in this difficult transition from Japanese to ROC rule that the Mainlanders began to
be perceived – and to perceive themselves – as a distinct ethnic group. As Corcuff wrote:
The people associated with the geographical entity of Mainland China were also associated
with a regime, an army, a police force, but more important still, an ideology, a project for
winning back the lost continent… A new ethnic category was in the process of being born
(Corcuff, 2002: 166). 
18 In many ways, the Mainlanders of this generation already resembled diasporas as defined
by  Safran  as  expatriate  minority  communities  characterized  by  memories  of  their
homeland, a desire to return, and a collective identity constructed around it. The crucial
difference  between  the  first  generation  of  Mainlanders  on  Taiwan  and  immigrant
diasporas, however, was that the Mainlanders held the reins of power in Taiwan. Unable
to return to China, at least in the short run, they committed themselves to the Chinese
Nationalist Party and to reshaping Taiwan to their own image as the Republic of China.




19 Colonialism,  in  the  sense  of  postmodern  anthropology,  is  many  things  at  once:  an
ideological project and an institutional order, a process and an existential state-of-mind,
but above all, a construction and negotiation of difference in situations of unequal power
(Comaroff,  1998).  In the 1960s,  when decolonization was beginning in Africa and the
memories  of  February  28,  1947,  were  still  fresh  in  the  memories  of  the  Taiwanese,
colonialism was clearly the existential state-of-mind of most Taiwanese:
Today most of the 10,000,000 Formosans look upon the nearly 2 000 000 mainlanders who fled
to  Formosa  with  the  collapse  of  Kuomintang  rule  as  foreign  overlords  and  describe  the
Chinese  nationalist  regime  as  a  colonial  tyranny  far  more  oppressive  than  the  former
Japanese rule. That the overwhelming majority of Formosans favour the establishment of an
independent Formosan state, without ties to mainland China and, preferably, without the
presence of Mainlanders, is a fact that can no longer be ignored (Meisner, 1963: 91).
20 In the early decades of Chinese Nationalist rule, just as under Japanese administration,
the government discriminated against Native Taiwanese in favor of the colonizers. This
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systematic discrimination fostered a sense of ethnic identity among both Mainlanders
and  Native  Taiwanese  (Gates,  1981:  261).  In  addition  to  political  domination,  the
government  owned  or  controlled  most  of  the  larger  industries  and  commercial
enterprises,  the  transportation  system  and  public  utilities.  In  employment,  they
systematically discriminated against Native Taiwanese employees, often blocking hiring
or promotion with the excuse that the Taiwanese did not speak Mandarin well enough. In
the school system and military, as well, Taiwanese were subordinated to Mainlanders.
The Chinese Nationalist state, not to mention local officials and police, also used their
political domination to extract taxes, fees and levies for political campaigns from Native
Taiwanese farmers.  All  of  these practices  kept  alive a  feeling of  antagonism towards
Mainlanders (Meisner, 1963: 100-101). Anthropologist Hill Gates argued the construction
of ethnic difference actually benefited both ethnic groups and the government. In the
early decades of Chinese Nationalist rule, a separation of Mainlander soldiers and the
Taiwanese  lower  class  helped  maintain  political  stability  and  control  the  population
(Gates, 1981: 269). 
21 The cultural domination of the Chinese Nationalists over Taiwan was firmly implanted by
the 1960s in processes well known to scholars of the cultural dimensions of colonization
(e.g. Comaroff, 1989, Comaroff and Comaroff, 1989, Cooper and Stoler, 1989, Dirks, 1992).
Chinese Nationalist education and media denigrated Taiwanese local culture, including
life-styles,  cuisine,  and  religion  as  backwards  and  rural.  Members  of  both  groups
internalized those values (Gates,  1981:  253).  In order to force the Taiwanese to learn
Mandarin  Chinese,  children  were  often  beaten,  humiliated,  or  fined  for  speaking
Japanese,  Taiwanese,  or  even  aboriginal  languages  in  school  (Morris,  2004:  25).  The
Chinese Nationalist party-state took all possible measures to implant their symbolic rule
over Taiwan,  tearing down Shinto shrines and other Japanese monuments,  renaming
streets after place names in China, and erecting statues of both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang
Kai-shek all over the island. Like colonial regimes in Africa, the Chinese Nationalists had
to fabricate what Comaroff (1998: 329) called “an entire space-time world” with its logic
insinuated into the most mundane practices of citizens now re-membered as Chinese. 
22 The educational system taught children that China represents all  that is modern and
good, and that they should be proud to be Chinese rather than foreign, Japanese, or even
locally  Taiwanese  (Simon,  2005:  35-36).  Beginning  in  1968,  Chinese  Nationalists  with
missionary zeal  even brought  adult  women into “Mothers’  workshops” on Confucian
ethics, emphasizing that Taiwanese women are traditional Chinese wives and mothers
who should thus work for free in their husbands’ subcontracting workshops (Greenhalgh,
1994;  Hsiung,  1996).  Taiwanese  who  resisted  sinicization,  and  especially  those  who
advocated the independence of Taiwan from the Republic of China, faced imprisonment
or worse. Some political prisoners were summarily executed (Arrigo, 1998). 
23 As so often happens in colonial situations (Fanon, 1967), many Taiwanese internalized the
idea that the language and cultural markers of the colonizers were more prestigious than
those of the local people. Under the sway of colonial mentality, Peking opera was elevated
to high culture, while local opera and puppet shows were denigrated as high class. The
National Palace Museum in Taipei highlighted the pageantry of Chinese history, while
younger generations of  Taiwanese learned nothing about their  island’s  past.  Socially,
Native  Taiwanese  often  worked  as  servants  for  Mainlanders,  but  even  the  poorest
Mainlanders would not work as servants for the Native Taiwanese (Meisner, 1963: 101).
The prestige of the Chinese was even reflected through hypergamy, as there was a trend
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for Native Taiwanese women to marry Mainlander men but not for Mainlander women to
marry Taiwanese (Meisner, 1963: 103). A generation later, the children of such couples
still tend to self-identify as Chinese Mainlanders rather than as Taiwanese. In the 1970s,
however, the dialectic of history began to work in another direction as the experience of
subordination led to counter-hegemonic movement. 
 
Crisis, democratization, and the taiwanization of
identity
24 The Chinese Nationalist state on Taiwan went through a series of crises in the 1970s. In
1971, the Republic of China lost its UN seat, which was given to the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) – more than twenty years after its establishment in 1949. The UN General
Assembly  debated  about  the  possibility  of  Taiwan  retaining  its  seat  in  the  General
Assembly, with Tunisia and Saudi Arabia both proposing resolutions to that effect (Lin,
1986: 28-29). This proved to be impossible, however, due both to general sympathy to an
anti-imperialist Chinas and Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence that his regime represented all of
China.  Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975,  to be succeeded as president by his son Chiang
Ching-kuo.  In  1978,  the  United  States  established  diplomatic  ties  with  the  People’s
Republic of China and broke off ties with the Republic of China. As the Chinese Nationalist
project to take back China began to lose legitimacy throughout the world and in Taiwan,
Mainlanders  and  Native  Taiwanese  alike  began  demanding  democratic  reform.  Even
President  Chiang Ching-kuo was forced to look to the people of  Taiwan for  political
legitimacy. Unlike his father, he stressed his friendship with local people and encouraged
Native Taiwanese participation in the Chinese Nationalist Party (Wachman, 1994: 153).
25 In December 1979, a pro-democracy march was held in Kaohsiung, only to be suppressed
by the police. The trials of the main leaders, including Annette Lu who would eventually
become vice-president in 2000, were widely publicized in the media, bringing debates on
Taiwanese independence into public discourse. For the first time in over thirty years,
people started to question publicly if the Chinese Nationalist Party were not a foreign
occupying force and Taiwan better off as an independent country. In dialectics familiar to
Gramsci,  Taiwanese counter-hegemonic nationalism began to emerge from Nationalist
domination.  Even in  the  early  days,  however,  Taiwanese  nationalists  reached out  to
Mainlanders as members of a Taiwanese diaspora, showing that the movement was not
just about ethnonationalism. As Annette Lu said in her 1979 rally speech:
It doesn’t matter if you speak Chekiangese or Cantonese, or for that matter Uigur – in as
much as we are all in the same boat, we should learn to love each other. Our bonds should be
of the heart. Should we not take each other’s hand and struggle together for the future of
Taiwan? (International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, 1981: 45).
26 Throughout  the  1980s,  a  dangwai (nonparty)  movement  gained momentum,  with  the
wives of arrested activists often winning local elections as independent candidates. In
1986,  the  dangwai candidates  formed  the  Democratic  Progressive  Party,  although
opposition  parties  were  still  illegal.  In  1987,  Chiang  Ching-kuo  finally  gave  into  the
pressure of social activists and lifted martial law. In 1991, his successor Native Taiwanese
Lee  Teng-hui  lifted  the  “temporary  provisions”  that  had made  it  illegal  to  advocate
Taiwanese independence.
27 During  the  presidency  of  Lee  Teng-hui  (1988-2000),  the  balance  of  power  between
Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese shifted dramatically. President Lee continued Chiang
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Ching-kuo’s practices of  Taiwanizing the party and the state.  He went much further,
however,  by  encouraging  the indigenization  (bentuhua)  of  official  discourse.  In  what
political  scientist  Stéphane  Corcuff  (2002b)  calls  the  “symbolic  dimension  of
democratization,”  statues of  Chiang Kai-shek were removed from public  squares,  the
national hymn was no longer required to be played before movies, and banknotes were
redesigned  with  local  Taiwanese  rather  than  Chinese  themes.  By  far  the  most
controversial reform, however, was the introduction of Taiwan-centric curriculum in the
school system, which drew the anger of Mainlander politicians. The Taiwanese language
grew in prestige, a change visible in daily life, as well as in political campaigns when even
Mainlander candidates had to give rally speeches in a language they once suppressed.
28 At the end of Lee Teng-hui’s term, symbols of both the old and new regimes existed
together, much like those of the pre- and post-apartheid eras in Nelson Mandela’s South
Africa in a policy of “Reconciliation” (Corcuff, 2002b: 97). Increasing indigenization of
public life, however, made the Mainlanders seem more and more like outsiders in Taiwan.
Although they had lost many of their old privileges, such as preference for employment,
few  were  willing  to  look  critically  at  their  own  past.  With  the  elections  of  Native
Taiwanese Chen Shui-bian of the DPP to the presidency in 2000 and 2004, ethnic relations
continued to grow tense as both major camps used the theme of ethnicity to mobilize
voters. It was in this context that Mainlander identity became relevant as a Diasporic
identity, and specifically as what some (Schnapper, 2001: 17) call a “mobilized” one.
 
Mainlander identity in the 2000s
29 Amidst all of the changes, Mainlanders had to negotiate new identities in daily life. In
order to distinguish themselves from the legacy of  Chiang Kai-shek and a history of
oppression, many began to portray their family histories as a diasporic journey from
China to Taiwan. In an illustrative example, a Taipei coffee shop owner re-membered her
family’s past in a life history:
(My father) was different from other Mainlanders, since his circumstances were different
from those that came over with the government. Most people can say that their fathers were
in government or in business. But my father did neither. He simply came here as a tourist,
and  then  had  to  stay  behind.  After  that,  his  life  was  a  tragedy.  Why  is  that?  Those
Mainlanders who came over with the government had salaries, ranks in the government and
free housing. The business people who came over had a lot of money. But my father had none
of that. I grew up in a family without roots (Simon, 2003: 71).
30 Whereas Mainlanders once constructed their identities as Chinese living in the Republic
of China, decolonization led to the construction of a new Taiwan around them, leading
some to feel as if they were not accepted by local people. Many felt marginalized as the
Taiwanese language became more prevalent  in daily  life,  making them seem socially
awkward and disadvantaged at work. Some felt as if they were materially disadvantaged
as well. As a Native Taiwanese business class expanded, in fact, they did indeed create a
business environment where Mainlanders were excluded, at least if they refused to learn
Taiwanese. Ironically, the changing social situation was the result of earlier residential
segregation, since Taiwanese farming families profited from rising real estate values and
the  city  settlements  of  Mainlanders  decayed  into  urban  blight.  The  ethno-national
sentiments of many Taiwanese, broadcast on radio talk shows and echoed in the daily
conversation of many Native Taiwanese, made many Mainlanders feel like strangers in a
country they had not chosen for themselves.
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31 The Mainlander dilemma is that they can no longer return to China – most second– and
third-generation Mainlanders were born in Taiwan and had never even been there. Yet
they are not quite fully Taiwanese, as can be seen in the failure of Mainlander politicians
to  be  accepted  in  an  identity  as  “New  Taiwanese”  (Corcuff,  2002:  186-189).  As  one
Mainlander told me about his identity dilemma both in Taiwan and while doing business
in China: “In Taiwan, they say I am Chinese and don’t accept me as fully Taiwanese; in
China, they say I am Taiwanese and don’t accept me as fully Chinese.” This is a classic
diaspora experience.
32 Because they fear Taiwanese ethnonationalism, Mainlanders are vulnerable to political
mobilization. Although some individuals support Taiwanese nationalism, Mainlanders as
a group tended to vote in 2000 and 2004 for the Chinese Nationalist Party and the People
First Party,  both of which promised to preserve the Republic of China as opposed to
pursuing formal independence. Both parties promised to seek a closer relationship with
China, including the possibility of re-unification if  China were to become democratic.
Republic  of  China  nationalism became known as  the  “pan-blue”  camp.  This  form of
Chinese  nationalism,  although  clearly  different  from  that  expressed  in  the  People’s
Republic  of  China,  led  many Mainlanders  to  become hostile  toward the  “pan-green”
parties that favor the formalization of Taiwanese independence. 
33 Ethnic  relations  were  especially  tense  during  the  events  surrounding  the  2004
presidential elections. On the eve of the election, DPP incumbent candidates Chen Shui-
bian and Annette Lu were campaigning in Chen’s hometown of Tainan. As the candidates
passed through the crowds in a jeep, two shots were fired, injuring Chen in the abdomen
and Lu in the leg. Both flew back to Taipei that evening with minor injuries. After the
election,  when  Chen  was  re-elected  with  a  slim  majority  of  50.11%,  the  pan-blue
candidates Lien Chan and James Soong refused to concede defeat. Two years later, many
Mainlanders still insisted that the assassination attempt had been staged by the DPP to
garner sympathy votes. Some Mainlander intellectuals even began to argue that the DPP
victory had ushered in an era of “green terror” designed to marginalize adherents of
Chinese nationalism. Differences in Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese became especially
visible in terms of both national identity and opinions for the future of Taiwan. 
34 Public opinion surveys in Taiwan regularly ask the question: Are you Chinese (and not
Taiwanese), Taiwanese (and not Chinese), or both Chinese and Taiwanese? Mainlanders
clearly have stronger China consciousness than any other ethnic groups.  In the 2005
survey  by  Decision  Making  Research  for  the  Mainlander  Taiwanese  Association
(Waisheng-Taiwanren  Association,  2005),  only  30.2%  of  Mainlanders  identified  as
Taiwanese, as opposed to 43.8% who identified as Chinese and 22.2% as both. By contrast,
68% of Hoklo identified as Taiwanese, as opposed to only 14.8% as Chinese and 12.4% as
both (see Table 1). The fact that 66% of Mainlanders affirm Chineseness as at last part of
their  identities,  as  opposed to  only  27.2%  of  Hoklo  Taiwanese  and  40.8%  of  Hakka
Taiwanese, demonstrates that Mainlanders still tend to feel more Chinese than Taiwanese
and that  Taiwanese nationalist  consciousness  has taken strongest  root  among Native
Taiwanese. It is worth noting, however, that nearly a third of Mainlanders identify as
Taiwanese only. Although Mainlanders are still the most Chinese of all Taiwan residents,
large numbers are accepting diasporic identity as both Chinese and Taiwanese. Many are
even assimiliating to Taiwanese national identity.
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Table 1: National identity in Taiwan according to ethnic identity1
35 Question:  In  Taiwan,  some  people  consider  themselves  Taiwanese;  others  consider
themselves Chinese. How do you consider yourself?
 No. of cases Taiwanese only Chinese only Both Taiwanese and Chinese Other
Hoklo 793 68.0% 14.8% 12.4% 4.9%
Hakka  71 53.5% 22.5% 18.3% 5.6%
Mainlanders 162 30.2% 43.8% 22.2% 3.7%
Source: Waisheng-Taiwanren Association and Decision Making Research, 2005: 88.
36 Ethnicity plays a strong role in how individuals envision the future of Taiwan and its
relationship with China (see Table 2). Like all diasporic communities, a good number of
Mainlanders aspire towards a “return,” although usually not in a physical  sense.  For
those Mainlanders who have returned to China after travel restrictions were lifted in
1985,  in  fact,  the experience has  often been disappointing as  they found themselves
alienated from long-lost relatives, or subjected to demands for money (see Simon, 2005:
125). 
37 For many Mainlanders, the desired “return” has become more symbolic than physical,
and is expressed as an emotional attachment to the Republic of China (not the People’s
Republic of China) and a rejection of formal Taiwanese independence; which would entail
a  permanent  loss  of  Chinese  identity.  For  this  reason,  support  for  the  formal
independence of Taiwan is much lower among Mainlanders than among other ethnic
groups. In the same survey taken for the Mainlander Taiwanese Association, only 19.1% of
Mainlanders support independence, as opposed to 48.9% of Hoklo and 38.6% of Hakka
respondants.  Mainlanders are also the most likely to support unification,  at  16.7% as
opposed to 10.2% for Hoklo and 14.3% for Hakka respondents.
 
Table 2: Opinions on unification according to ethnic identity
38 Question:  In  terms of  the  future  development  of  cross-straits  relations,  some people
advocate unification and others advocate independence.  Do you prefer unification or
independence?
Ethnic Group No. of cases Independence Unification Status Quo Don’t know
Hoklo 793 48.9% 10.2% 31.1% 9.7%
Hakka  71 38.6% 14.3% 38.6% 8.6%
Mainlanders 162 19.1% 16.7% 57.4% 6.8%
Source: Waisheng-Taiwanren Association and Decision Making Research, 2005: 90.
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39 Regardless of ethnicity, the number of individuals who support unification is relatively
low because even most “pro-unification” individuals in Taiwan reject adherence to the
present-day People’s Republic of China. Some people believe that unification requires the
precondition of democratization in China; and others think that independence is possible
only if China renounces the threat of force against the island. In both cases, people who
hold such opinions prefer to maintain the status quo. Most of the 57.4% of Mainlanders
who want to maintain the status quo are either content with the existence of a de facto
independent  Republic  of  China limited to Taiwan,  or are rejecting independence but
holding off on unification until the time is right. Some Taiwanese also reject unification
and are holding off for independence only when the conditions are right, but that logic is
more common among Hoklo and Hakka Taiwanese.
40 There is also a difference in the way that members of different ethnic groups define the
status quo. When asked if Taiwan and China are separate nations, or if Taiwan is part of
China, only 42% of Mainlanders said that the two places are separate nations, as opposed
to 67.1% of Hoko respondents. 38.3% of Mainlanders say that Taiwan is part of China,
compared to only 16.3% of Hoklo respondents. The idea that Taiwan is part of China is
derived from Chinese Nationalist Party ideology, as the party has long maintained that all
of China belongs to the Republic of China and denied the legitimacy of Communist rule.
 
Table 3: Definitions of the Status Quo of Taiwan
41 Question: Some people say that Taiwan is part of China; there are also people who say





Taiwan  and  China  are  two
independent nations




Hoklo 793 67.1% 16.3% 16.6%
Hakka  71 62.9% 27.1% 10%
Mainlanders 162 42% 38.3% 19.8%
Source: Waisheng-Taiwanren Association and Decision Making Research, 2005: 82.
42 Chillingly,  however,  anthropological  research  shows  that  Mainlander  Chinese
nationalism is sometimes stronger than democratic values and a respect for difference.
Some Mainlanders even welcomed China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which legislated
“non-peaceful” means if Taiwan officially seceded from China, because they saw it as a
way of forcing nationalistic Taiwanese to abandon the option of independence. While
conducting research in an aboriginal village, I also heard one older Mainlander, retired
from an influential  community  position, boast  that,  “we  Mainlanders  and aboriginal
people will regain our normal status if (Chinese Nationalist candidate) Ma Ying-jeou wins
the 2008 (presidential election).” This attitude illustrates the psychology of Mainlanders
who have accepted neither Taiwanese national aspirations nor their new Diaspora status
in democratizing Taiwan. This individual believes that Mainlanders naturally belong in
positions of power over Native Taiwanese. If colonization for the colonized is a way of
interacting with others “on terms not of their choosing” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991:
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15), then so is decolonization for the colonizers. Some Mainlanders, including political
leaders,  are  abandoning  their  colonial  privileges  for  diasporic  identities  just  as
reluctantly as did whites in South Africa. The tensions of empire are yet to be resolved. 
 
Some comparisons in lieu of a conclusion
43 It is tempting to make facile comparisons between Taiwan and South Africa, as did Wu
Rwei-Ren in his argument that “the Mainlanders were in fact a powerful minority group
not unlike the Afrikaaners in democratized South Africa” (Wu, 2001: 202).  Although I
ultimately  disagree  with  Wu  on  the  details,  there  are  some  interesting  historical
convergences  that  merit  discussion.  Europeans  in  South  Africa  and  Han  Chinese  in
Taiwan, for example, both moved to their new territories in response to the 17th century
activities of the Dutch East India Company. 
44 It  is  important,  however,  to  make  a  distinction  between  different  kinds  of  colonial
relationships,  to  recognize  that  a  plurality  of  colonialisms  (and decolonizations)  can
occur simultaneously, and to note that the process is not linear. The most important
qualitative distinction between forms of colonialism is between settler colonialism and
state colonialism, both of which create different diasporic identities. With this in mind, I
think  that  there  is  little  similarity  between  the  Mainlanders  of  Taiwan  and  the
Afrikaaners of South Africa. The Native Taiwanese are more similar structurally to the
Afrikaaners; both groups having moved into their new territory from elsewhere 350 years
ago and having accepted their new territory as their homeland. Like the Afrikaaners, who
refer  to  their  Dutch  origin  language  as  Afrikaaner,  the  Native  Taiwanese  call  their
Chinese language Taiwanese. The ethnic labels of Native Taiwanese and Afrikaaners also
indicate the extent  to which they are identified with their  new territories  and have
ceased to be diasporas. 
45 Native Taiwanese and Afrikaaners alike embraced nativist forms of nationalism, in spite
of the fact that their historical origins lay outside of the national territories they claimed.
In both cases, settler colonists do not neatly fit into the Safran’s definition of diasporas.
Although they share a historical experience of dispersal from their homeland, they do not
share the other characteristics of diasporic communities including collective memories of
that homeland, a belief that they are not accepted in their new land, a desire for return,
support of their homeland, and a collective identity constructed around their place of
origin. Instead, they are the nativist groups in relation to which the diaspora group is
defined (Clifford, 1994). 
46 State colonialism, or direct colonial administration over others, creates a distinct form of
diaspora in the form of the colonizers. This is the structural similarity between
Mainlander  Nationalist  rule  over  Taiwan  and  British  rule  over  South  Africa.  The
competing nationalisms in Taiwan, therefore, resemble that of a defensive Afrikaaner
nationalism faced with the “civilizing mission” of British administration in the 19th and
early 20th centuries.  The question then arises of which group in Taiwan most closely
resembles the Black South Africans. It is surely not the “Native Taiwanese,” but rather
the Austronesian aborigines of the island. Like the blacks of South Africa, they lived on
their native territory for millennia. They first lost control of their territory in western
Taiwan when “Native Taiwanese” began settling in large numbers on the island in the
seventeenth century (Brown 2004, Shepherd 1993). The arrival of the Republic of China in
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Taiwan did not represent decolonization to them any more than the arrival of the British
in South Africa meant liberation for Black South Africans. It was merely the exchange of
one colonial power for another. 
47 Obviously, any structural comparison between South Africa and Taiwan quickly reaches
its limits. Taiwan did experience some residential segregation in Taiwan in the sense that
many Mainlanders lived in juancun (housing for the military and their dependents), and
there was job discrimination against the Native Taiwanese in the beginning of Chinese
Nationalist  rule.  Nonetheless,  Taiwan  never  experienced  the  total  separation  and
inhumane violence of  Apartheid.  There was  an ideological  colonization of  Taiwanese
consciousness, but largely because most Mainlanders honestly believed that Mainlanders,
Native Taiwanese and even indigenous Austronesians were all Chinese in some essential
way. Faced with the obvious linguistic and phenotypic differences between the former
groups and the Austronesians, they made the ideological claim that the Austronesians
had originated in China in prehistoric times (Ku, 2005: 106). To a certain degree, however,
Mainlander attempts to teach Native Taiwanese and Austronesians to be Chinese were as
well-intentioned as the activities of some Protestant missionaries in South Africa who
tried to cross ethnic lines by appealing to a broader sense of humanity. In both cases, they
believed that they were introducing the colonized subjects to a superior civilization. 
48 In the final  analysis,  however,  any structural  similarities  between Taiwan and South
Africa are less important than the theoretical insights that can be gained by juxtaposing
the two cases. First, both cases demonstrate that ethnic identities are primarily relations
between  historically  constituted  groups  rather  than  essentially  defined  objects.  Like
other forms of  ethnicity,  diaspora marks a  relationship between groups.  Second,  the
manipulation of ethnic relations can be an effective tool in governmentality. That process
reinforces ethnic boundaries;  albeit  with consequences often unpredicted by those in
power.  Thirdly,  in situations of colonialism or decolonization when new groups seize
power, relationships between the groups are subject to struggle and negations. These
processes are pluralistic and may happen simultaneously. Both processes are reversible,
depending upon how the groups involved exercise political power. Fourthly, groups are
defined as diasporas primarily in relationship to somebody else’s national community.
Diasporic identity is thus a part of the nationalist imaginary. 
49 In Taiwan, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism made Mainlanders, combined with their own
continued  ties  to  an  imagined  Republic  of  China,  into  a  diasporic  community  –  the
Chinese of Taiwan. Like the whites of South Africa, they became a diaspora without even
moving because a new nation grew up around them. They are a diaspora, however, only
to the extent that they accept the legitimacy of Taiwanese national aspirations. Their
situation is very different from, for example, the Chinese diaspora the United States or
France, because some of them resist the formation of a Taiwanese nation-state at all costs
and insist that Taiwan must be Chinese forever. Few, if any, Chinese in the Vancouver or
San Francisco would think of claiming Chinatown as part of China. The negotiation of
diasporic  identity  thus  happens  also  within  larger  negotiations  of  colonization  and
decolonization  and  not  just  within  the  experience  of  immigration.  In  Taiwan,  those
negotiations  are  much more  complicated  than elsewhere  because  an external  power
continues to mobilize ethnicity for its own imperial design. 
50 Most importantly, I have chosen to compare Taiwan to South Africa rather than to other
comparable colonial situations like Québec, which has been under English domination
since the 18th century, because I believe that the South African experience offers a limited
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space of hope. In post-Apartheid South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
(TRCs) have made important steps toward ethnic reconciliation and a new constitution
has  laid  the  legal  framework  for  a  pluralistic,  postmodern  state.  There  have  been
problems in South Africa, as some whites have perceived the TRCs to be ANC-inspired
witch hunts (McEachern, 2002: 22). In addition, ethnic mobilization continues to be an
effective strategy in South African political campaigns, which casts doubt on the future of
ethnic relations there (Davis, 2004).
51 At the very least, however, the TRCs have given South Africans what Nancy Scheper-
Hughes calls a “good enough” truth, a narrative that puts different groups “on the same
map rather than living in different nations across the road from each other” (Scheper-
Hughes, 1998: 127). In Taiwan in 2005, Native Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian signed
a “10-point consensus” with Mainlander opposition leader James Soong promising that
the two parties would cooperate, among other things, on ethnic reconciliation. He also
promised to include a clause in a new constitution for indigenous peoples, which would
recognize their rights to tribal autonomy. Maybe these changes, like the TRCs of South
Africa,  can  lead  Taiwan towards  a  “heteronationalism”  that  “celebrates  the  right  to
difference as first principle” (Comaroff, 1996: 177). If white and black Africans can work
together to build a new South Africa, surely there is opportunity for members of different
ethnic groups to build a new Taiwan. 
52 WU Rwei-Ren (2002)  Toward  a  pragmatic  nationalism:  democratization  and Taiwan’s
passive revolution, in Stéphane Corcuff Éd., Memories of the future: national identity issues
and the search for a new Taiwan, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, pp. 196-218.
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NOTES
1. This  survey,  conducted  by  the  Decision-Making  Research  Company,  January  28-29,  2005,
includes residents of the Taipei Metropolitan Area. N=1,042 (+-3.1%, p<.05). The three aboriginal
responses were eliminated from the table because the sample is  too small  to be meaningful.
Thanks to Chang Mau-kuei, Academia Sinica, for providing the data.
ABSTRACTS
This paper looks at the construction of diasporic identity in Taiwan among the Mainlanders who
arrived with Chiang Kai-shek at the conclusion of World War II. In the early decades of Chinese
Nationalist rule, which many Taiwanese perceived as colonial rule, ethnic differences between
Mainlanders and Native Taiwanese were constructed through state violence, political oppression,
and discrimination in favour of Mainlanders. With democratization, the numerically dominant
Native Taiwanese began to assert Taiwanese nationalism and Mainlanders started to question
their  identity.  Some adopted a  diasporic  identity  as  Chinese in Taiwan while  others  resisted
change.  Mainlander diasporic identity is  constructed primarily in relationship to the nativist
nationalism  of  the  Native  Taiwanese,  but  also  to  the  autochtonous  identity  of  Taiwan’s
indigenous tribes. Diaspora identity is thus relevant not only in situations of immigration, but
also in processes of colonialism and subsequent decolonization.
Cet article traite de la construction de l’identité diasporique des Chinois du continent arrivés
avec Chiang Kai-shek à Taiwan à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Pendant les premières
décennies de l’autorité nationaliste chinoise, que beaucoup de Taiwanais considéraient comme
une autorité de type colonial, les différences ethniques entre autochtones taiwanais et Chinois du
continent  se  construisirent  à  travers  la  violence  d’État,  l’oppression  politique  et  la
discrimination. Avec le processus de démocratisation, les indigènes taiwanais, majoritaires en
nombre,  commencèrent  à  affirmer  un  nationalisme  taiwanais,  et  les  Chinois  du  continent
commencèrent  à  questionner  leur  identité.  Certains  d’entre  eux  adoptèrent  une  identité
diasporique comme Chinois de Taiwan, alors que d’autres résistèrent au changement. L’identité
diasporique  des  Chinois  du  continent  est  construite  essentiellement  en  rapport  avec  le
nationalisme indigène des autochtones taiwanais, mais aussi avec l’identité indigène des tribus
autochtones de Taiwan. L’article montre que l’identité diasporique est pertinente non seulement
dans  les  situations  d’immigration,  mais  aussi  dans  les  processus  de  colonisation  et  de
décolonisation.
Este articulo trata de la construcción de la identidad “diaspórica” de los chinos del continente
llegados a Taiwán después la Segunda Guerra Mundial con Chiang Kai-shek. Durante las primeras
décadas  de  la  autoridad  nacionalista  china,  que  muchos  taiwaneses  consideraban  como  una
autoridad  de  tipo  colonial,  las  diferencias  étnicas  entre  taiwaneses  autóctonos  y  chinos  del
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continente se construyeron a través de la violencia de estado, de la opresión política y de la
discriminación.  Con  el  proceso  de  democratización,  los  indígenas  taiwaneses,  mayoritarios,
comenzaron  a  afirmar  un  nacionalismo  taiwanés.  Por  su  parte,  los  chinos  del  continente
empezaron a  cuestionar  su  propia  identidad:  ciertos  de  entre  ellos  adoptaron una identidad
“diaspórica” reivindicándose a si mismos como chinos de Taiwán mientras que otros resistieron
al cambio. La identidad “diaspórica” de los chinos del continente se construye esencialmente en
relación con el nacionalismo indígena de los taiwaneses autóctonos y con la identidad indígena
de las tribus autóctonas de Taiwán. El artículo muestra que la identidad “diaspórica” no sólo es
pertinente  en  situaciones  de  inmigración  sino  también  en  procesos  de  colonización  y  de
descolonización.
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